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Following-is a short survey of facts which, although they have 
already been publicized on previous occasions, seem to ae largely 
ignored by the Chamber's assessment of U.S,-Community economic and 
trade relations. 
* * * * 
Favorable Development of US-EEC Trade 
At present (1969) total trade between the United States and the 
Community is three times as high as in 1958. This growth of trade,has 
been uninterrupted and has been faster than the average for vorld 
trade, Every year from 1960 to 1970 the United States has had a large 
surplus on its trade account with the Community. The ~ollowing table 
gives the figures. 
US-EEC TRADE FIGURES 
1960 - 1970 
(In Mio $) 
- EXPORT IMPORT EEC Trade Deficit 
Dest. USA Orig •. ·usA with the U.S. 
1960 ,' 
,_..;---· 
2 .·242 3.830 1.588 
1961 2.232 4.053 - 1.821 
1962 2.447 4.453 - 2.006 
1963 2.563 5.051 - 2.489 
1964 2.849 5.438 2.589 
1965 3.425 5.683 - 2.268 
1966 4.098 6.022 1.924 
1967 4.424 . 5.898 1.474 
1968 5. 769 6.393 624 
1969 5.958 7.326 - 1.368 
1969 (1st 6 months) 2.840 3.470 630 
1970 If ,, II 3.090 4.460 1.370 
These figures show that: 
- U.S. exports to the Common Market during the first half of 1970 
climbed 29 per cent over the same period last year. 
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- The United States sold $4.46 billions in goods to the Common 
Market during the first six months of 1970 as compared to $3.47 billions 
in 1969. 
- During the same period, the European Community's exports to 
the United States increased by only 9 per cent, increasing in value 
from $2.84 billions to $3.09 billions. 
- Thus, the Common Market's half year trade deficit with the 
United States reached a record close to $1.4 billion. The heavy trade 
surplus enjoyed by the United States with the Common Market in the 
first half of 1970 equals the trade surplus for the entire year of 
1969, which stood at $1.37 billion. 
- From 1958 to 1969, exports from the United States to the European 
, Community grew by 182%; during the same period, American exports to 
the rest of the world increased only by 118%. 
Nothing suggests that this trend will not be maintained in the 
future and extrapolated in an enlarged Community. 
Among the factors that contributed considerably to the gt'VW'th 
of U.S. eh-ports to the EEC, a major element undoubtedly was the rapid 
rise in the standard of living which went hand in hand with the 
creation of a very lirge market in the Community. This factor is due 
to gain importance in an enlarged Community. In other words, overall 
U.S. imports into Britain, Ireland, Denmark and Norway should be 
favorably influenced by the positive effects which these countries' 
entry into the Common Market will most ·probably have on their rate of 
economic growth. 
Also, the establishment of the Community's common customs tariff, 
and the redu~tions made on this tariff in major trade negotiations 
have given impetus toward a liberal trade policy in the world. The 
Cownunity has, as a result of a series of tariff reductions, the 
lowest tariff among the leading industrialized nations. Once the last 
two reductions resulting from the Kennedy Round are implemented betwean 
now and the end of 1971, the average Community tariff for industrial 
products will be substantially lower than the United States', United 
Kingdomss or Japanese average. In addition, the Community's tariff 
structure~ which resulted inttially from the averaging of member states 
former tariffs, dpes not have any of those very high rates, in some 
cases above 100 per cent, which are still characteristic of the 
American tariff for certain industrial products which are thus assured 
a very substantial and, in some cases, even prohibitive level of 
protection. On valuation for customs purposes, the Community, but 
not the United States, follows the rules of the Brussels Convention and 
cannot, therefore, resort to practices which artificially increase 
the incidence of customs duties by an arbitrary assessment of the 
value of a produ~t. 
The effort that has been made by the Community in its tariff 
policy should be recognized when its role in the field of international 
economic relations is appraised. 
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It should also be kept in mind that, in the case of enlargement, 
the U.K. Market, for instance, would become more accessible to trade 
with the rest of the world, for British tariffs would ire reduced to the. 
much lower Community tariff levels. 
Increasing Activity of American Firms in the Community 
One should not overlook the extent to which American firms have 
developed activities within the Community where they have found ad-
ditional opportunities for expansion. 
From 1958 to 1969 direct investments by American firms in the 
Community increased about five-fold, their total assets reaching a 
book value of more than 9 billion dollars compared with 1.9 billion 
dollars in 1958.In no other region of the world has investment by 
American firms expanded at such a spectacular pace; in fact, their 
investments elsewhere have only doubled in the same period. At present. 
American firms established in the Conu:nunity account for about one-
seventh of 111 new industrial investment. While at the beginning this 
development was sustained yy large exports of American capital, presently 
the capital for these investments very often comes from issues floated 
in Europe. 
The United States economy, therefore, benefits doubly from European 
integration; from a considerable increase in trade ben,een the United 
States and the Community, and from a substantial rise in income from 
investment in Europe which is making a major contribution to improvement 
of the U.S. balance of payments. 
As investment policies of the ap~licant countries - U.K., Ireland, 
Denmark, Norway - do not differ suestantially from the policies followed 
in this regard by the European Conununity countries, preoccupations 
about the consequences of enlargement in this field are equally un-
justified. 
The overall picture of EEC-US relations demonstrates that the 
Community does not follm, restrictive or proteEtionist policies. The 
Community is the world's largest importer from both industrialized and 
developing countries, and the growth rate of its foreign trade is 
higher than that of the other western nations. It is in the Community's 
interest to be outward-looking, because of its dependence on world 
trade in the formation and growth of its national product. The EEC's 
imports and exports account for nearly 20% of its gross national 
product, while in the United ptates the corresponding figure is 
only 7%. 
The United Kingdom!s economic structure being in this respect 
comparable to the Community countries', the basic trade attitudes of 
an enlarged Community are certainly not bound to change. 
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fhe Community's agricultural policy 
In the Community there is an awareness that the common agricultural 
policy is strongly criticized by the United States and other countties. 
Here again, any serious analysis should include both a product-by-
product examination and a look at overall trends, Within the Community, 
efforts arc being made to bring under control the surpluses which have 
occurred in some sectors, especially in milk and milk products, and 
to start structural reforms that are indispensable. 
However, the Community is still the most important market by far 
for U.S. agricultural e>.1>orts. In 1968 the Community imported American 
agricultural products worth 1.4 billion dollars f.o.b. compared to 
1.1 billion dolilrs in 1960. True, between 1966 and 1968 there was a . 
drop in American agricultural exports, which in 1966 had risen to 
l.~ billion dollars but the decline was not confined to exports to 
the Community. In theeyears 1967-69 American exports of agricultural 
products to all parts of the world were lower than in 1966, which was 
a record year. World trade in these products is slowed mainly by the 
stagnation of food consumption in the highly developed countries and 
by the rapid growth of agricultural productivity and production. It 
would therefore be unreasonable to attribute the recent drop in U.S. 
agricultural exports to the Community solely to the effects of Commu-
nity protection. Indeed, the share of the Col!l1Ilunity in U.S. agricultural· 
exports hardly changed during recent years (roughly 25%). In this 
context it must be pointed out that approximately 607. of the Community's 
imports of agricultural products from the United States come in 
duty-free and without any restriction. 
The growth of government expenditure on agriculture is common to 
all countries, even where the productivity per farm worker is higher 
and the farming population smaller than in the Community (in the United 
States 4.6$ of the working population was employed in agriculture 
in 1968; in the Community the figure was 20% dm 1960 and today it is 
still 147.). If a comparison is made between agricultural support per 
person employed (budgetary expen~iture plus cost borne by the consumer. 
through higher prices) in the United States and the EEC, the figures 
are of the same magnitude, despite the fact that the competitivity 
of agriculture in America is on the whole higher than in the Community. 
Likewise, the difficulties encountered in reconciling domestic 
agricultural policy and its human and social proble~s with import 
policy are common to all developed countries, but they have decided 
to solve them in different ways. The United States was granted a 
waiver oE the normal GATT rules which allows it to apply the Agricultural 
Adjustment Act of 1933, and it pursues restrictive import policies on 
items such as milk products, sugar, and T!leat, while it subsidizes certain 
exports. The Community has, for some major products, set up a levy 
system (which replaces the quantitative restrictions, customs dute,s 
and other charges applied earlier by the member states) and export 
refunds. Other countries have other :methods. 
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mo'te often the scene of rivalry between public treasuries than of compe-
tition between producers. 
On several occasions the press has spoken of "price wars'' betweea 
the Community and other exporters on world markets for certain Jlgri-
cultural products, in particular grains and poultry. True~ in some cases, 
Community grain exporters did not respect the minimum prices set by 
the International Grains Agreement. But the same has been true also 
for exporters of other countries, including the United States. Indeed, 
all had to cope with an excessive supply on the world market. With 
regards to poultry, American, Danish and Community exporters compete 
by means of substantial subsidies in soma European markets where the 
price level has also been affected by competition from East European 
countries. 
It is urgently necessary, if not to remedy this situation, at 
least to limit its consequences, and this requires an effort by all 
the leading exportin@ and importing countries. It was in this spirit 
that the Community proposed, as part of the Kennedy Round. that 
support in agriculture, whatever its form, should be frozen on the 
basis of reciprocity. This proposal was rejected by the U.S. Efforts 
must continue to find some form of international discipline which 
will obviate the damage produced by the clash of national policies on 
hhe world market. 
Most cases which have of late created irritation on both sides of 
the Atlantic can reasonably be solved through a reciprocal effort. 
Also, the impact of British entry on U.S. farm exports has been 
greatly exaggerated. In fact, there is only one major U.S. agricultural 
product, feed grain, which benefits from a slightly higher protection 
in the European Community than it does presently in Britain. On such 
important U.S. export items as soybeans, oilcakes, vegetable oils, 
dried fruit and vegetables, the level of EEC protection is either 
lower or about the same as that of Britain. In the case of tobacco, 
which is the most important single agricultural product eJq>orted to 
Britain, accounting for about two-fifths of the total U.S. farm exports,' 
total tariff and excise charges are higher in Britain than in the 
Community. Considering these factors, it is not excluded that U.S. 
farm e>..-ports to Britain, which have been stagnating at about $AOO 
millions during the last six years, may be stimulated as a consequence 
of Britain/is joining the European Communit~. 
The Community's Association and Trade Agreements with Third Countries. 
I 
The Community's relationship with a numb.er of African. Mediterranean 
and other European countries is also a field where Europeans believe 
that American criticism shows unsufficient information about the basic 
facts. 
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The Community association agreementq with African nations is 
not only historically motivated. The sudden severance of their 
special ties with Cpmmunity countries in the early 1960's would have 
caused these young African states untolerable hardships hnd the 
Community not stepped in with direct and trade aid. Furthermore, this 
agreement leads to a free trade area and is in conformance with article 
XXIV of GATT. The association agll:!eements with Turkey and Greece, each 
leading to eventuallfull membership, are also sanctioned by the CATT. 
Other countries, in the Mediterranean area, have asked for special 
agreements with the Community since their economies and exports are 
very similar to those of currently-associated countries. Because of 
their degree of development and/or because of their small size, they 
would no doubt suffer injury if they were totally excluded from the 
broad integaation movement which is going on in Europe. On the other 
hand, these countries'. political situation did not allow them to 
take long-range commitments about a precise calendar establishing a 
free trade area. The Community was confronted here with a political 
responsibility, It accepted to negotiate a number of preferential 
agreements with countries like Israel and the United Arab Republic. 
There are also a number of European countries thaf will eventually 
become members of the European Community, but which, for the time 
beingi cannot assume the political and economic obligations of full 
membership. Yet it is of vital importance for them that mutually 
acceptable solutions be found to settle their problems. (Canada and 
the U.S., finding themselves in a somewhat comparable situation, have 
solved their.special trade difficulties mn a basis limited to the auto-
mobile industry. By virtue of the u.s.-Canadian automotive agreement ,. / 
of 1965. U.S. and Canada carry out about one-third of their automotive v. 
trade free of duties and other restrictions.) · 
Until now, none of the Community association agreements have 
damaged world trade and certaiily not U.S. exports. On the contrary, 
eliminating or reducing tariff barriers and quotas between the 
Community and its associates has had a liberalizing effect on trade 
in general. This was most apparent in the case of the African associates. 
Hany of these nations previously flad very restrictive and protective 
foreign trade policies. Since 1957, U.S. exports to the eighteen African 
associates~ for instance, have grown three times faster than the Community's 
own exports to these countries. Europeans believe that regional trade 
liberalization will prove to be the forerunner of worlwide trade 
liberalization. 
Trade relations linking the Community .with tome of its European, 
Mediterranean and African neighbors have not inhibited Community efforts 
to promote a system of gen~ralized preferences for all the developing 
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The Community was the first, in 1964, to support the establishment 
of generalized preferences for manufactures and semi-manufactures 
exported by the developing conntries. Since then, other industrialized 
countries, including the United States, have declared themselves ready 
in principle to introduce tariff preferences for the developing 
countries. The system proposed by the Community would provide duty-free 
entry for all these products without exception up to a ceiling which 
would be equal to twice the present total volume of exports of those 
products from developing countries to the EEC. There are no safeguard 
clauses, no reciprocity or o~~er conditions for the participation of 
any developing country. These trade advantages would benefit primarily 
the developing countries in Latin Amkrica and Asia. They would complement 
the considerable efforts already made by the Community and its member 
states through public and private development aid, which in relation 
to CNP is substantially greater than that made by the United States 
(in 1968, EEC: 4.2 billion dollars or 1.12% of GNP; United States: 
5.7 billion dolilre or 0.65% of GNP.) 
American Measures Affecting the Community 
In the United States one has the impression that complaints· 
about the Community by far exceed in number and importance any 
criticisms that the Community Eould make about the United States. 
It must be pointed out, however, that various events and tendencies 
in·the United States have caused disappointment and concern in the 
Community. 
For example, the CATT waiver obtained by the United States in o,rder 
to protect its agriculture is considered an anomaly because of its 
comprehensive character and the fact that it has: been maintained since 
19S5. Likewise, the fact that, because of e~rlier legislation, the 
United States is not subject to the coTnmon rules observed by other 
countracting parties concerning countervailing duties is meeting with 
less and less understanding. 
The American restrictions in the milk products sector, which 
were tight~ned up in 1968, seem excessive, and it is regrettable that 
the Community's efforts to solve by administrative cooperation the 
problems in this sector have met with no response. 
In 1968, the United States unilaterally increased customs duties 
on certain woolen products which were consolidated in the Kennedy 
Round. This action, which was taken without following normal GATT 
procedures and without any offer of compensation, has caused understand-
able concern in the Community, particularly because of the precedent 
thus created. 
Likewise the introduction in 1968 of import restrictions on 
certain products of the mechanical industries has done considerable 
harm to firms in the Community. 
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Finally, one could add, in this connection, that the delay of 
action by Congress concerning the abolition of ASP, which is part of 
the formal Kennedy Round agreements, has caused scepticis~ in Europe 
as to the U.S.' scredibility in the field of non-tariff barrier removal.· 
But there is also concern about the general direction of American 
trade policy, especially since sector-by-sector restricttons, either 
through private agreements or self-limitation imposed by the government, 
or even through legislation quotas for whole sectors,are advocated 
in the United States. Abandonment of the broadly liberal policy pursued 
by the United States since the Second World War and a return to such 
restrictive practices would inevitably start a chain reaction detrimental 
to the expansion of world trade. Such a development would not be in 
the common interest of the Western countries. 
Necessity for Cooperation between EEC and US 
To the contrary, it is more necessary than ever for the two 
leading partntt.s in world trade, the United States and the Community, 
to agree that the proble~s affecting individual sectors or causing 
temporary difficulties between them must be overcome. They must also 
agree on their fundamental long-term attitudes. In view of the 
importance of the United States and the Community, nothing that they 
do is without consequence for other countries. 
Together, they have responsibility for the future de,,relopment 
of international ecnommic relations. It is only through close cooperation 
between themselves and with the other trading nations that the continu-
ation of the liberal trade policy which has ··been the major factor in 
promoting world trade in the past 25 years can be assured. 
The U.S. and European business and financial leaders have a 
major role to play, because of their many common interests in developing 
and maintaining harmonious relations between the United States and 
the Common Market. They can do this by establishing closer contacts 
with each other, to be better able to·understand at first hand the 
factors involved in shaping and changing Europe as well as U.S.-
European trade, commercial and financial relations. Armed with this 
appreciation, they will be able to make their voices heard in their 
own governments ar times when short-sighted interests on either side 
of the Atlantic may threaten the hannony of relations and the common 
interests of the Atlantic business community. Certainly, the Chamber 
could play a vital role in such a development. 
I realize that my letter has been a rather lengthy one. However, 
I hope it will serve as an objective comment to the Chamber's report 
of October 12 on U.S.,EEC relations. 
,-1,· ... ' 
Sincerely yours, 
Leonard n. Tennyson 
Director 
